Supreme Court Denies Certiorari in Baystate v. Bowers
June 16, 2003. The Supreme Court denied certiorari, without
opinion, in Baystate v. Bowers, a patent, copyright and contract
case involving CAD software. See, Order
List [10 pages in PDF], at page 4. This denial lets stand the January 29,
2003, revised
opinion of the U.S.
Court of Appeals (FedCir) which addressed federal preemption, shrink wrap
contracts, and reverse engineering. Basically, a shrinkwrap contract barred
reverse engineering of a software program. A divided Appeals Court held that
the Copyright Act does not preempt state contract law that allows parties to
impose a ban on reverse engineering.
Background.
Harold Bowers created a template to aid in the use of computer aided design
(CAD) software, such as the CADKEY tool of Cadkey, Inc. He filed a patent
application for his template in 1989, and U.S.
Patent No. 4,933,514 was issued in 1990.
CAD software works with menus, and menus nested
within menus, which may be difficult for some to use. Bowers' patent disclosed
a template, or desktop digitizing tablet, with various commands arranged in
logical locations. The user points to and clicks upon the desired command.
George Ford designed Geodraft, a DOS based add-on
program to operate with CAD. Geodraft allows an engineer to insert technical
tolerances for features of the computer generated design. He copyrighted
Geodraft. Bowers then obtained an exclusive license to Ford's Geodraft. Bowers
then bundled and sold his template and Geodraft software, with a shrink wrap
agreement that prohibits reverse engineering.
Baystate then developed a competing template and
software, which incorporated features of Bowers' product. Under competition
from Baystate, Bowers entered into a distribution agreement with Cadkey whereby
Cadkey bundled Bowers' template and software for free. Bowers sought to make
money off of selling software upgrades. Baystate subsequently acquired Cadkey,
and repudiated the contract with Bowers.
District Court. Baystate filed a complaint in U.S. District Court (DMass) against
Bowers alleging that Baystate's products do not infringe the '514 patent, that
the '514 patent is invalid, and that the '514 patent is unenforceable. It
sought declaratory relief. Bowers filed counterclaims for copyright
infringement, patent infringement, and breach of contract, including the
prohibition on reverse engineering.
The trial jury found for Bowers on all claims, and
awarded him $1,948,869 for copyright infringement, $3,831,025 for breach of
contract, and $232,977 for patent infringement. The District Court set aside
the copyright damages as duplicative of the contract damages. The District
Court rejected Baystate's claims regarding patent invalidity.
Baystate appealed. Bowers cross appealed the
District Court's denial of copyright damages.
Court of Appeals: August 20, 2002, Opinion. The Appeals Court issued its original
opinion on August 20, 2002. This opinion was reported at 302 F.3d 1334. It
affirmed in part, and reversed in part. It affirmed the breach of contract
award. It also affirmed the District Court's modification of the damages award
(i.e., the copyright damages are duplicative of the contract damages). Finally,
it reversed the judgment as to patent infringement, as a matter of claim
construction.
The Appeals Court held that the Copyright Act, and
in particular, 17 U.S.C. § 301, does not preempt
or narrow Bowers' contract claims. The Court held this as a matter of the
law of the originating Court, the First Circuit.
The Court further found that Bowers had presented ample evidence of reverse
engineering by Baystate of the subject matter covered by the shrink wrap
contract. The Court affirmed the judgment for breach of contract, and the
dollar amount of the award.
The Appeals Court then affirmed the District
Court's decision to set aside the jury's award of copyright damages. It wrote
that "The shrink wrap license agreement prohibited, inter alia, all
reverse engineering of Mr. Bowers' software, protection encompassing but more
extensive than copyright protection, which prohibits only certain copying. Mr.
Bowers' copyright and contract claims both rest on Baystate's copying of Mr.
Bowers' software. ... In this case, the breach of contract damages arose from
the same copying and included the same lost sales that form the basis for the
copyright damages. The district court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion
by omitting from the final damage award the duplicative copyright
damages."
The Appeals Court also wrote that "Because
this court affirms the district court's omission of the copyright damages, this
court need not reach the merits of Mr. Bowers' copyright infringement
claim."
On the patent infringement claim, the Appeals
Court reversed. It wrote that "this court perceives no basis upon which a
reasonable jury could find that Baystate's accused templates infringe claim 1
of the '514 patent." Hence, there was no literal infringement. Bowers did
not assert infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
Petition for Rehearing. Baystate filed a combined petition for panel rehearing and
rehearing en banc.
Several groups and individuals submitted an amicus
curiae brief [15 pages in PDF]. The amici included the Digital Future Coalition (DFC), Association of Research Libraries (ARL), American Library Association (ALA), American Association of Law Libraries
(AALL), Computer & Communications
Industry Association (CCIA), Association for
Computing Machinery (ACM), and others. Mark
Lemley, of UC Berkeley's Boalt Hall, is listed as counsel of record for
amici.
The amicus brief states that "Common among
all amici is a commitment to encouraging authorship and innovation by
maintaining the free flow of ideas and information. Amici are concerned that
the Panel decision could disrupt this flow."
The amicus brief argued that software reverse
engineering is critical to innovation and competition in the computer industry,
and that the Appeals Court's August 20, 2002, opinion wrongly suggests that
copyright law imposes no restriction on shrinkwrap licenses.
Amici wrote that "For this Court to allow
software vendors unilaterally and without restriction to impose terms that
prohibit reverse engineering would frustrate the policy of encouraging the
creation of innovative and interoperable software products." They added
that "Contractual restrictions on reverse engineering can also interfere
with the operation of the federal patent system."
Court of Appeals: January 29, 2003, Opinion. The Appeals Court issued an order on January 29, 2003,
granting the petition for panel rehearing, denying the petition for en banc
rehearing, and vacating the August 20, 2002, opinion. The Appeals Court also
issued a revised
opinion on January 29, 2003.
The revised opinion reached the same conclusion --
that the Copyright Act does not preempt Bowers' contract claim regarding
reverse engineering. The language of the revised opinion mirrors that of the
original opinion. However, the revised opinion adds a partial dissent by Judge
Dyk. He had joined the majority in the original opinion, but was swayed by
arguments in support of the petition for rehearing.
The majority's analysis of Copyright Act
preemption of state contract law is set out in more detail here. The Court
first held that on issues that are not unique to the jurisdiction of the
Federal Circuit, the law of the originating circuit applies. It held that under
First Circuit law, the Copyright Act does not preempt or narrow Bower's
contract claim.
The Appeals Court wrote that "Courts respect
freedom of contract and do not lightly set aside freely-entered
agreements."
"Nevertheless, at times, federal regulation
may preempt private contract." The Court elaborated that "The Copyright
Act provides that ``all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright ... are governed
exclusively by this title.´´ 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000). The First Circuit does
not interpret this language to require preemption as long as ``a state cause of
action requires an extra element, beyond mere copying, preparation of
derivative works, performance, distribution or display.´´ Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1164, 32 USPQ2d 1385, 1397 (1st Cir.
1994)". (Additional citations omitted.)
The Court continued that "The First Circuit
has not addressed expressly whether the Copyright Act preempts a state law
contract claim that restrains copying. This court perceives, however, that Data
General's rationale would lead to a judgment that the Copyright Act does
not preempt the state contract action in this case. Indeed, most courts to
examine this issue have found that the Copyright Act does not preempt
contractual constraints on copyrighted articles."
It concluded that "case law indicates the
First Circuit would find that private parties are free to contractually forego
the limited ability to reverse engineer a software product under the exemptions
of the Copyright Act. Of course, a party bound by such a contract may elect to
efficiently breach the agreement in order to ascertain ideas in a computer
program unprotected by copyright law. Under such circumstances, the breaching
party must weigh the benefits of breach against the arguably de minimus damages
arising from merely discerning non-protected code."
The
Appeals Court then applied this law to the facts of this case. It found that
"the contract unambiguously prohibits ``reverse engineering.´´" It
also found that "The record amply supports the jury's finding of a breach of that agreement." Hence, it
affirmed the District Court on this issue.
Dyk Dissent.
Judge Timothy Dyk wrote
that "I have concluded that our original decision on the preemption issue,
reaffirmed in today's revision of the majority opinion, was not correct. By
holding that shrinkwrap licenses that override the fair use defense are not
preempted by the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq., the majority
has rendered a decision in conflict with the only other federal court of
appeals decision that has addressed the issue -- the Fifth Circuit decision in Vault
Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988). The majority’s approach permits
state law to eviscerate an important federal copyright policy reflected in the
fair use defense, and the majority’s logic threatens other federal copyright
policies as well."
He issued a warning: "If by printing a few
words on the outside of its product a party can eliminate the fair use defense,
then it can also, by the same means, restrict a purchaser from asserting the
``first sale´´ defense, embodied in 17 U.S.C. § 109(a), or any other of the
protections Congress has afforded the public in the Copyright Act. That
means that, under the majority's reasoning,
state law could extensively undermine the protections of the Copyright
Act."
However, he added that he dissents only as to
shrinkwrap contracts, and not as to negotiated contracts. He wrote that "I
nonetheless agree with the majority opinion that a state can permit parties to
contract away a fair use defense or to agree not to engage in uses of
copyrighted material that are permitted by the copyright law, if the contract
is freely negotiated."