OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF POLICE
THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SYSTEM
POLICY AND PROCEDURE MANUAL

Subject

Active Shooter/Active Assailant Policy

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Policy Number

814

Reference Standards

Naval Post Graduate School, Responding to High Rise Active Shooters (2018)
U.S. Department of Justice, FBI: Active Shooter Incidents in the United States from 2000-2018
International Association of Chiefs of Police Model Active Shooter Policy 2018;
Police Executive Research Forum Police Response to Active Shooter Incidents Report 2014;
Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT) Active Shooter Programs, Texas State University;
Ft. Worth Police Department Active Shooter Policy 2018;
Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Active Shooter Policy 2018;
Texas Department of Public Safety Tactical Standard Operating Procedures 2018;
Texas Department of Public Safety Physical Evidence Handbook;
After Action Report (AAR) Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Route 91 Harvest Music Festival Event 2018/2019
Consultation with Texas Rangers and the FBI Campus Liaison Office
Police Foundation

I. PURPOSE

To provide general guidance utilizing contemporary best practices in preparation for Active Shooter/Active Assailant Events where one or more suspects armed with firearms, knives, explosives or other weapons has used deadly force on one or more victims and continues to do so while having unrestricted access to additional victims and the objective appears to be mass murder.

This policy should be read in conjunction with UTSP Policy 330-Tactical Trauma Care—Law Enforcement Self Aid/Buddy Aid; Policy 601-Use of Force; Policy 604-Firearms, Less Lethal Weapons and Ammunition; Policy 605-Administrative Investigation of Critical Incidents Including Use of Deadly Force and Officer Involved Deaths; Policy 735-Discreet Armored Vehicles; Policy 736-Emergency Rescue Armored Personnel Vehicles (Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles/MRAP) Mission and Use; Policy 742-System Rapid Response Team (SRRT); Policy 802-Unusual Occurrences, Disturbances and Special Operations.
II. POLICY

A. It is the responsibility and policy of the University of Texas System Police (UTSP) to respond, contain, and stop active shooter/active assailant threats. Further, it is the practice of this department, based on current professional standards and national best practices, to give initial responding officers the authority and responsibility to take singular and immediate action to neutralize these threats (Immediate Intervention Concept of Operations).

B. It is the goal of UTSP to eliminate the threat as rapidly as possible and immediately follow on with the provision of life-saving care either by our personnel and/or by campus/local partners when appropriate.

III. DEFINITIONS

A. Active Shooter/Active Assailant - An active shooter is defined as one or more person(s) armed with firearms, knives, or other weapons who has used deadly force on one or more other person(s) and continues to do so while having unrestricted access to additional victims. The subject’s overriding objective appears to be mass murder rather than some other type of criminal conduct, such as robbery or kidnapping.

B. Rapid Intervention - The swift and immediate deployment of law enforcement personnel and resources to an ongoing, life threatening situation where delayed deployment of personnel could otherwise result in death or serious bodily injury to innocent persons.

C. Contact Teams - The first officer(s) at the scene of an active shooter/active assailant event tasked with locating the suspect(s) and neutralizing the threat.

D. Rescue Task Force - Organized teams of resources composed of Fire Department/EMS personnel escorted by Police Department personnel that make entry after the contact team has neutralized or contained the threat/suspect in order to provide immediate medical aid to victims and evacuate victims from a hostile environment.

E. Incident Commander (IC) - The individual who takes charge at the scene, regardless of rank. In many cases, this may be the first individual on the scene until relieved.

F. Incident Command System (ICS) - A standardized approach to the command, control, and coordination of emergency response providing a common hierarchy within which responders from multiple agencies can be effective.

G. Unified Command - In the Incident Command System, a Unified Command is an authority structure in which the role of incident commander is shared by two or more individuals, each already having authority in a different responding agency.

H. The Hot Zone - The area where there is a known hazard or threat to life that is potentially direct and immediate. This includes any uncontrolled area where the active shooter could directly engage people with gunfire.

I. The Warm Zone - The areas where law enforcement has either cleared or isolated the threat, and the risk is minimal/reduced or has been mitigated.

J. The Cold Zone - The area where there is no threat and that law enforcement has secured.
K. **Tactical Combat Casualty Care-(TCCC)** - The immediate and limited care needed before transitioning to more advanced life support to prevent the death of the individual during movement. Usually limited to application of a tourniquet or pressure bandage(s).

L. **Casualty Collection Point** - A location that is used for the assembly, triage, medical stabilization and subsequent evacuation of casualties.

M. **University of Texas System Rapid Response Team (SRRT)** - Composed of four regional squads of specially equipped and trained police officers (20-25 total) to support situations which may exceed the extended capability of responding patrol officers or which are so protracted in length or complexity as to require an enhanced tactical response. SRRT training is focused on four primary contingencies which include Active Shooter, Emergency Hostage Rescue, Quick Response Force for Special Events and Executive Protection. The team is airborne capable utilizing UT System and Texas Department of Transportation (TXDOT) aircraft lessening response time to remote locations.

SRRT vehicle deployment package consists of discreet armored vehicles, command van and SUV equipped with conventional breaching equipment, diamond bladed quick saw, chain saw, hydraulic jaws of life, small throwable robot, large multi-mission robot, infrared/thermal pole inspection camera, infrared (IR) under door camera, long range lens camera, spike strips, single and multi-launchers to deploy a variety of less lethal and chemical munitions, rifle and pistol rated portable shields, portable ladder (e.g. bus assault), gas grenades, smoke grenades, flash bang/distraction devices, IR markers, digital and video recording capability, and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV/drone) technology. Semi-automatic heavy caliber precision rifles with a night scope and breaching shotguns are also available. All team members are trained and equipped for night operations utilizing night vision and IR laser aiming devices.

N. **Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) and Tactical Response (TRT) teams** - designated law enforcement teams, whose members are recruited, selected, trained, equipped and assigned to resolve critical incidents involving a threat to public safety, which would otherwise exceed the capabilities of traditional law enforcement first responders and/or investigative units.

O. **WIN- “What’s Important Now.”** - Acronym used by the famous college football coach Lou Holtz. The simple act of asking this question causes us to briefly pause while our mind imagines the impact of the choices we have and rapidly brings to mind the most desirable one. This one powerful question allows us to prioritize decisions, choices, and actions in high risk circumstances.

### IV. PRE-EVENT PREPARATION

A. Each Institution shall have in place a plan governing Active Shooter/Active Assailant Response and deployment/self-deployment protocols between local Law Enforcement, Fire/EMS and other first responders. The plan should also be an annex to an Institution’s overarching Emergency Management Plan (or equivalent plan).

B. Formalized joint training with area Law Enforcement, Fire, EMS and area Hospitals shall be conducted periodically at the direction of the institution chief of police. Tabletop exercises should not only focus on stopping the threat but also include the investigative follow-on and aftermath aspects of a mass casualty event.
C. An area Communications Interoperability plan shall be in place and emergency communications tested at the direction of the institution chief of police.

D. Multiple means of emergency messaging to students, faculty and staff must be in place and tested regularly and shall be the responsibility of the institution chief of police or his/her designee in coordination with campus partners.

E. Procedures for the assessment of persons exhibiting behaviors of concern that may pose a threat shall be in place as designated by the institution chief of police with the support and participation of campus partners.

F. Healthcare institutions have unique challenges different from traditional campuses, where areas such as operating rooms, vertical spaces and intensive care units cannot be easily evacuated. These issues need to be considered in response planning and training. Institution chiefs of police with healthcare, hospital or medical facilities shall identify, address and resource for the unique risks and threats posed in such environments. The University of Texas System Police Medical Director and Deputy Medical Director are available to assist in planning of this nature.

G. Each Institution shall conduct regular active shooter/active assailant response training for their officers utilizing the latest contemporary best practices from the Texas State University Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT) Center, University of Texas System Police Advanced Rapid Response Emergency Scenario Training (ARREST), and other pertinent training with increased emphasis on single officer response, individual officer weapon proficiency, structure clearing tactics, open air tactics to combat active shooters from elevated/barricade positions of advantage and tactical combat casualty care as the highest priority.

H. All UTSP officers engaged in regular field operations duty shall be equipped with a carbine rifle, rifle resistant body armor, hemorrhage control kits and have met the firearm qualification standards established by the Office of the Director of Police. Patrol units should be equipped with additional hemorrhage control kits and breaching gear with sufficient capability to mechanically open any conventional door locked or bound closed with a chain. A breaching plan should be in place with law enforcement partners who have energetic breaching capability and/or tactical vehicles with breaching capability to defeat all fortified doors that cannot be quickly opened using conventional means.

I. All UTSP officers should be familiar with the availability and operation of the Discreetly Armored Rescue Vehicles (UTSP Policy 735, Discreet Armored Vehicle) staged in their region and aware that the UTSP System Rapid Response Team (SRRT) has enhanced tactical and technical capability (UTSP Policy 742, System Rapid Response Team) as well as heavily armored Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles for rescue that are available for support should the event become protracted or require such resources. (UTSP Policy 736, Emergency Rescue Armored Personnel Vehicles)

J. Command Staff and field personnel Sergeant and above should have Incident Command System training appropriate for their position and likely assignment during an emergency event.
V. ACTIVE SHOOTER/ACTIVE ASSAILANT RESPONSE

A. The overall purpose of active shooter/active assailant response tactics is to save lives. The goal for police response at an active shooter/active assailant event is to stop the threat as quickly as possible to prevent harm to additional victims, and to accomplish this through whatever lawful means necessary while limiting the loss of lives from survivable injuries by integrating immediate medical support in treatment of the casualties.

B. These incidents are sufficiently unique that their effective handling cannot always be totally reduced to a prescribed set of procedures. This general guidance is intended to provide a framework for a coordinated response. This policy is intended to provide sufficient flexibility and authority for institution police departments, sometimes operating in very different physical environments from one another, to design, draft and implement the unique or exclusive specific operating procedures necessary for the local setting.

C. Initial Responder Immediate Action

1. Whenever possible, the first two (2) to five (5) responding officers should form a single contact team and enter the affected area or structure immediately. The first officers entering the area or structure should recognize that their primary objective is to stop further violence. In the event that a single officer has arrived on scene and the officer believes active violence is occurring at that time and no immediate assistance is available, then that individual officer will move immediately to engage and stop the threat without assistance.

2. Responding officers should identify and attempt to stop active threats as their first priority. Once the threat has been stopped, officers should begin assessing victims needing medical attention. If practical, and absent continued threats, officers should treat any significant hemorrhaging that may result in the immediate loss of life and provide situational awareness and pertinent information to other responding units and incident command.

3. Officers encountering a locked or barricaded entrance shall breach the opening whenever necessary. Breaching should be accomplished using whatever tools are available by applying generally accepted techniques including prying, striking and the use of specially designed tools to defeat such tactics.

4. Breaching, by ramming with a vehicle or with the use of a shotgun, should be considered when officers encounter a locked or barricaded door in association with the presence of a driving sensory or kinetic force (sounds of gunfire, suspect on view, screams for help, offender’s known location, escalating violence) signifying ongoing or imminent deadly/lethal behavior on the part of the suspect.

5. Shotgun breaching should only be utilized by personnel who have been properly trained in the technique and have demonstrated proficiency in its use. Such training is a standard component of the Advanced Rapid Response and Emergency Scenario Training (ARREST) delivered at the University of Texas System Police Academy.
D. Establish Incident Command and Contact Team Response

1. Initial Incident Command should be established by the most qualified officer, regardless of rank, who is physically on scene. Should a more qualified officer arrive on scene, a transfer of command may be considered. When taking command of an incident, the term “IC” will be added to the call sign of the officer until Incident Command is transferred or the incident concludes.

2. A contact team response of two (2) or more officers to an active shooter situation is preferred in generally all active shooter situations, irrespective of any initial actions that may have been taken. Even if the threat has apparently been terminated, contact teams are required to render the location safe, assist in screening and orderly evacuation of persons to a designated area, and locating any other threats that still may be concealed or undisclosed.

3. Although only one contact team may have been initially deployed to the incident, additional contact teams can be deployed at the direction of the IC to provide tactical advantage as soon they become available. IC shall ensure that each team is aware of the other teams’ locations and actions. Additional teams can be utilized to establish Casualty Collection Points for injured persons, provide security for advanced life support trained personnel (EMS, paramedics, fire/rescue) entering the hot/warm zones and if in a medical center or healthcare environment, provide for the defense of hospital intensive care units, operating rooms, or other areas that cannot be readily evacuated.

4. All personnel are to restrict their radio use for emergency traffic only. The contact team shall be provided a clear communication channel to provide the following categories of information:

   a. The team’s progress and location.

   b. The location and number of victims and their medical needs.

   c. The estimated number of suspects involved.

   d. The suspects’ descriptions and weapons if known.

5. The team shall identify the location of any explosive device or potential explosive configuration that is likely to kill, harm or surprise responding officers. If discovered, the contact team leader shall report and mark the location for later render safe and removal procedures.

6. The contact team (or the single officer as circumstances warrant) shall locate the suspect(s) in the most expeditious manner possible in order to stop the active threat. In doing so, the responding team(s)(or single officer as circumstances warrant) shall continue their pursuit or search for the suspect until the threat has been eliminated or the search has exhausted all alternatives and the team(s) have physically examined all potential locations where the suspect may be concealed, or until credible intelligence establishes that the threat no longer exists. The decision to render aid to victims or those initially exposed to violence or in jeopardy shall be coordinated with the contact team(s) pursuit and search efforts.
7. The team should employ tactical advantages, such as avoiding use of the main entrance, to provide an element of surprise and to avoid improvised explosive devices or ambush.

8. The contact team should not attempt to conduct a thorough clearing of the affected location but should follow immediately available and actionable intelligence such as sounds of gunfire, screaming, observations of victims and bystanders and related information to help locate the suspects as soon as possible (hot pursuit).

9. If the active shooter/active assailant event transitions into a hostage or barricade situation and no further victims are actively being attacked at that time, or when attackers begin making demands, contact teams should utilize the "5 C's" as taught in Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT): Contain, Control, Communicate, Call support, and Create an immediate action plan.

10. An inner perimeter shall be established as soon as practical to control access/ingress to and exit/egress from the target location. Innocent parties, trapped persons and bystanders/passersby should be directed out of the inner perimeter/hot zone to a designated secure location for identification and debriefing.

11. Secure staging areas for responding officers and other emergency services should be pre-designated and activated as needed by Incident Command as should a designated casualty collection point. Responding officers should be prepared to evacuate victims to the hospital using their patrol car if there is lack of medical personnel support available at the casualty collection point.

12. A staging manager with assistants should be assigned to the staging area to brief arriving first responders, maintain communication with the contact team and organize and assign duties as directed by the IC.

13. A second secure staging area (Family Notification/Reunification/Information Area) should be designated as soon as reasonably possible to accommodate arriving family members of persons at the affected location. It should not be located near the incident command post or at a hospital which will likely already busy and not necessarily equipped this extra burden. These individuals should be restricted to the staging area as they could pose a hazard to themselves, officers, and bystanders and jeopardize tactical or rescue operations. The family reunification area should be separate and apart from a third staging area for the media. All staging areas should be staffed with police officers to ensure safety.

14. Arriving/responding Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) and Tactical Response (TRT) Teams (including SRRT) operating under the authority of mutual aid, should be called upon, as needed, to assist in clearing the location of potential suspects, locate and evacuate persons in hiding, help render safe any dangerous munitions or armament and provide armored rescue vehicles. These teams may deploy precision marksmen and emergency rescue teams as required and take the lead in the resolution of hostage or barricaded gunman situations that may evolve. When the primary mission is completed they should assist with emergency casualty care as needed.

15. Each Institution should determine in advance if the use of a Rescue Task Force consisting of Fire, Police and EMS is a viable option for their Area of Operational Responsibility (AOR).
16. An Evacuation Center should be established to maintain care and control of all persons who are either evacuated or rescued and to document their identities until they can be reunited with family or others. Victims and witnesses suffering from emotional and/or physical trauma or shock should be kept under the observation of medical personnel until such time as they may be safely transported to a hospital or home in the care of family or friends.

E. Incident/Unified Command

1. The IC shall ensure that at a minimum the following actions are accomplished by activation of the affected Institution’s All Hazards Emergency Operations Plan (or equivalent document):

   a. Establish Unified Command with the appropriate personnel utilizing the Incident Command System.

   b. Establish communications interoperability.

   c. Coordinate with other responding emergency services utilizing the WIN “What’s Important Now” concept which allows officers to prioritize decisions based on what are most critical current and future needs.

   d. Activate staging areas for first responders, family unification, and media.

   e. Request mutual aid (referenced earlier: SWAT/TRT/SRRT) as needed with UTSP, local, regional, state and federal partners.

   f. Organize unified interagency telecommunications.

   g. Establish event traffic control and management.

   h. If needed, establish and/or activate rotary wing landing zones in coordination with EMS for medical evacuation. Work with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to restrict air space for law enforcement-medical use as dictated by the situation.

   i. Designate collection points for the injured and evacuation by EMS or medevac (referenced earlier).

   j. Initiate intelligence profiles on all suspects.

   k. Have available appropriately trained crisis intervention officers and critical stress debriefing officers, police chaplains and area clergy to provide support to those in need, whether they be victims, witnesses, evacuees, those rescued, family members or others tied emotionally to the event.

   l. Coordinate with the affected Institution for floor plans, site layout, and a roster (including emergency contact information as available) of employees, students, residents, visitors, or others believed to be on-site.
m. Establish a Public Information Officer/Affairs Team in order to disseminate accurate information (community notification) and speak in one voice on behalf of the affected institution and UT System. Ensure the public will know what social media platform will be available to obtain the latest information from the police.

n. If the event is suspected to be a terrorism related event, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has primary jurisdiction/authority for the investigation of such offenses and should be contacted immediately.

o. Identify employees with additional language skills that could be helpful.

p. Ensure rescue and recovery operations continue until the IC has declared the scene clear and safe.

q. Have a plan for volunteers that show up at the scene who may or may not be helpful.

VI. POST EVENT SUPPORT

A. Investigation of UTSP officers’ use of force will be followed in accordance with UTSP Policy 601, Use of Force. The Institution Chief will be responsible for developing investigative crime scene protocols with local, state and federal partners for significant incidents and/or mass casualty events.

B. Security and preservation of the crime scene will be paramount, particularly in protracted (by time) or expanded geographical investigative circumstances. UTSP personnel qualified in crime scene management (UTSP Policy 1203 Evidence Management) or equivalent experience/training should be given first consideration to assist with the forensic investigation and video documentation of the crime scene.

C. Incident Command shall establish demobilization procedures to ensure accountability of response personnel and equipment along with any reported injuries of response personnel.

D. Post-traumatic stress debriefing, crisis intervention counseling and emotional support protocols (referenced earlier) shall be made available in a consistent, structured and established fashion.

E. A process should be in place for retrieval/recovery of abandoned vehicles and personal effects from the crime scene when it is safe to do so.

F. Have a process in place for the direction of donations.

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Michael J. Heidingsfeld
Director of Police
Changes/Revisions since Last Publication

Minor changes only made to ensure language is current with national best practices; no substantive or material changes made, October 15, 2020